USE OF, IN RELIGION. The sublime, incomprehensible nature of
some of the Christian doctrines has so completely subdued the
understanding of many pious men, as to make them think it presumptuous
to apply reason in any way to the revelations of God; and the many
instances in which the simplicity of truth has been corrupted by an
alliance with philosophy confirm them in the belief that it is safer, as
well as more respectable, to resign their minds to devout impressions,
than to exercise their understandings in any speculations upon sacred
subjects. Enthusiasts and fanatics of all different names and sects
agree in decrying the use of reason, because it is the very essence of
fanaticism to substitute, in place of the sober deductions of reason,
the extravagant fancies of a disordered imagination, and to consider
these fancies as the immediate illumination of the Spirit of God.
Insidious writers in the deistical controversy have pretended to adopt
those sentiments of humility and reverence, which are inseparable from
true Christians, and even that total subjection of reason to faith which
characterizes enthusiasts. A pamphlet was published about the middle of
the last century that made a noise in its day, although it is now
forgotten, entitled, “Christianity not founded on Argument,” which,
while to a careless reader it may seem to magnify the Gospel, does in
reality tend to undermine our faith, by separating it from a rational
assent; and Mr. Hume, in the spirit of this pamphlet, concludes his
Essay on Miracles with calling those dangerous friends or disguised
enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to defend it by
the principles of human reason: “Our most holy religion,” he says, with
a disingenuity very unbecoming his respectable talents, “is founded on
faith, not on reason;” and, “mere reason is insufficient to convince us
of its veracity.” The church of Rome, in order to subject the minds of
her votaries to her authority, has reprobated the use of reason in
matters of religion. She has revived an ancient position, that things
may be true in theology which are false in philosophy; and she has, in
some instances, made the merit of faith to consist in the absurdity of
that which was believed.
The extravagance of these positions has produced, since the Reformation,
an opposite extreme. While those who deny the truth of revelation
consider reason as in all respects a sufficient guide, the Socinians,
who admit that a revelation has been made, employ reason as the supreme
judge of its doctrines, and boldly strike out of their creed every
article that is not altogether conformable to those notions which may be
derived from the exercise of reason. These controversies concerning the
use of reason in matters of religion are disputes, not about words, but
about the essence of Christianity. But a few plain observations are
sufficient to ascertain where the truth lies in this subject.
The first use of reason in matters of religion is to examine the
evidences of revelation. For, the more entire the submission which we
consider as due to every thing that is revealed, we have the more need
to be satisfied that any system which professes to be a divine
revelation does really come from God.
After the exercise of reason has established in our minds a firm belief
that Christianity is of divine original, the second use of reason is to
learn what are the truths revealed. As these truths are not in our days
communicated to any by immediate inspiration, the knowledge of them is
to be acquired only from books transmitted to us with satisfying
evidence that they were written above seventeen hundred years ago, in a
remote country and foreign language, under the direction of the Spirit
of God. In order to attain the meaning of these books we must study the
language in which they were written; and we must study also the manners
of the times, and the state of the countries, in which the writers
lived; because these are circumstances to which an original author is
often alluding, and by which his phraseology is generally affected; we
must lay together different passages in which the same word or phrase
occurs, because without this labour we cannot ascertain its precise
signification; and we must mark the difference of style and manner which
characterizes different writers, because a right apprehension of their
meaning often depends upon attention to this difference. All this
supposes the application of grammar, history, geography, chronology, and
criticism in matters of religion; that is, it supposes that the reason
of man had been previously exercised in pursuing these different
branches of knowledge, and that our success in attaining the true sense
of Scripture depends upon the diligence with which we avail ourselves of
the progress that has been made in them. It is obvious that every
Christian is not capable of making this application. But this is no
argument against the use of reason, of which we are now speaking. For
they who use translations and commentaries rely only upon the reason of
others, instead of exercising their own. The several branches of
knowledge have been applied in every age by some persons for the benefit
of others; and the progress in sacred criticism, which distinguishes the
present times, is nothing else but the continued application, in
elucidating the Scripture, of reason enlightened by every kind of
subsidiary knowledge, and very much improved in this kind of exercise by
the employment which the ancient classics have given it since the
revival of letters.
After the two uses of reason that have been illustrated, a third comes
to be mentioned, which may be considered as compounded of both. Reason
is of eminent use in repelling the attacks of the adversaries of
Christianity. When men of erudition, of philosophical acuteness, and of
accomplished taste, direct their talents against our religion, the cause
is very much hurt by an unskilful defender. He cannot unravel their
sophistry; he does not see the amount and the effect of the concessions
which he makes to them; he is bewildered by their quotations, and he is
often led by their artifice upon dangerous ground. In all ages of the
church there have been weak defenders of Christianity; and the only
triumphs of the enemies of our religion have arisen from their being
able to expose the defects of those methods of defending the truth which
some of its advocates had unwarily chosen. A mind trained to accurate
and philosophical views of the nature and the amount of evidence,
enriched with historical knowledge, accustomed to throw out of a subject
all that is minute and irrelative, to collect what is of importance
within a short compass, and to form the comprehension of a whole, is the
mind qualified to contend with the learning, the wit, and the sophistry
of infidelity. Many such minds have appeared in this honourable
controversy during the course of this and the last century; and the
success has corresponded to the completeness of the furniture with which
they engaged in the combat. The Christian doctrine has been vindicated
by their masterly exposition from various misrepresentations; the
arguments for its divine original have been placed in their true light;
and the attempts to confound the miracles and prophecies upon which
Christianity rests its claim, with the delusions of imposture, have been
effectually repelled. Christianity has, in this way, received the most
important advantages from the attacks of its enemies; and it is not
improbable that its doctrines would never have been so thoroughly
cleared from all the corruptions and subtleties which had attached to
them in the progress of ages, nor the evidences of its truths have been
so accurately understood, nor its peculiar character been so perfectly
discriminated, had not the zeal and abilities which have been employed
against it called forth in its defence some of the most distinguished
masters of reason. They brought into the service of Christianity the
same weapons which had been drawn for her destruction, and, wielding
them with confidence and skill in a good cause, became the successful
champions of the truth.
The fourth use of reason consists in judging of the truths of religion.
Every thing which is revealed by God comes to his creatures from so high
an authority, that it may be rested in with perfect assurance as true.
Nothing can be received by us as true which is contrary to the dictates
of reason, because it is impossible for us to receive at the same time
the truth and the falsehood of a proposition. But many things are true
which we do not fully comprehend; and many propositions, which appear
incredible when they are first enunciated, are found, upon examination,
such as our understandings can readily admit. These principles embrace
the whole of the subject, and they mark out the steps by which reason is
to proceed in judging of the truths of religion. We first examine the
evidences of revelation. If these satisfy our understandings, we are
certain that there can be no contradiction between the doctrines of this
true religion, and the dictates of right reason. If any such
contradiction appear, there must be some mistake; by not making a proper
use of our reason in the interpretation of the Gospel, we suppose that
it contains doctrines which it does not teach; or we give the name of
right reason to some narrow prejudices which deeper reflection, and more
enlarged knowledge, will dissipate; or we consider a proposition as
implying a contradiction, when, in truth, it is only imperfectly
understood. Here, as in every other case, mistakes are to be corrected
by measuring back our steps. We must examine closely and impartially the
meaning of those passages which appear to contain the doctrine; we must
compare them with one another; we must endeavour to derive light from
the general phraseology of Scripture and the analogy of faith; and we
shall generally be able, in this way, to separate the doctrine from all
those adventitious circumstances which give it the appearance of
absurdity. If a doctrine which, upon the closest examination, appears
unquestionably to be taught in Scripture, still does not approve itself
to our understanding, we must consider carefully what it is that
prevents us from receiving it. There may be preconceived notions hastily
taken up which that doctrine opposes; there may be pride of
understanding that does not readily submit to the views which it
communicates; or reason may need to be reminded, that we must expect to
find in religion many things which we are not able to comprehend. One of
the most important offices of reason is to recognize her own limits. She
never can be moved, by any authority, to receive as true what she
perceives to be absurd. But, if she has formed a just estimate of human
knowledge, she will not shelter her presumption in rejecting the truths
of revelation under the pretence of contradictions that do not really
exist; she will readily admit that there may be in a subject some points
which she knows, and others of which she is ignorant; she will not allow
her ignorance of the latter to shake the evidence of the former, but
will yield a firm assent to that which she does understand, without
presuming to deny what is beyond her comprehension. And thus, availing
herself of all the light which she now has, she will wait in humble hope
for the time when a larger measure shall be imparted.
some of the Christian doctrines has so completely subdued the
understanding of many pious men, as to make them think it presumptuous
to apply reason in any way to the revelations of God; and the many
instances in which the simplicity of truth has been corrupted by an
alliance with philosophy confirm them in the belief that it is safer, as
well as more respectable, to resign their minds to devout impressions,
than to exercise their understandings in any speculations upon sacred
subjects. Enthusiasts and fanatics of all different names and sects
agree in decrying the use of reason, because it is the very essence of
fanaticism to substitute, in place of the sober deductions of reason,
the extravagant fancies of a disordered imagination, and to consider
these fancies as the immediate illumination of the Spirit of God.
Insidious writers in the deistical controversy have pretended to adopt
those sentiments of humility and reverence, which are inseparable from
true Christians, and even that total subjection of reason to faith which
characterizes enthusiasts. A pamphlet was published about the middle of
the last century that made a noise in its day, although it is now
forgotten, entitled, “Christianity not founded on Argument,” which,
while to a careless reader it may seem to magnify the Gospel, does in
reality tend to undermine our faith, by separating it from a rational
assent; and Mr. Hume, in the spirit of this pamphlet, concludes his
Essay on Miracles with calling those dangerous friends or disguised
enemies to the Christian religion who have undertaken to defend it by
the principles of human reason: “Our most holy religion,” he says, with
a disingenuity very unbecoming his respectable talents, “is founded on
faith, not on reason;” and, “mere reason is insufficient to convince us
of its veracity.” The church of Rome, in order to subject the minds of
her votaries to her authority, has reprobated the use of reason in
matters of religion. She has revived an ancient position, that things
may be true in theology which are false in philosophy; and she has, in
some instances, made the merit of faith to consist in the absurdity of
that which was believed.
The extravagance of these positions has produced, since the Reformation,
an opposite extreme. While those who deny the truth of revelation
consider reason as in all respects a sufficient guide, the Socinians,
who admit that a revelation has been made, employ reason as the supreme
judge of its doctrines, and boldly strike out of their creed every
article that is not altogether conformable to those notions which may be
derived from the exercise of reason. These controversies concerning the
use of reason in matters of religion are disputes, not about words, but
about the essence of Christianity. But a few plain observations are
sufficient to ascertain where the truth lies in this subject.
The first use of reason in matters of religion is to examine the
evidences of revelation. For, the more entire the submission which we
consider as due to every thing that is revealed, we have the more need
to be satisfied that any system which professes to be a divine
revelation does really come from God.
After the exercise of reason has established in our minds a firm belief
that Christianity is of divine original, the second use of reason is to
learn what are the truths revealed. As these truths are not in our days
communicated to any by immediate inspiration, the knowledge of them is
to be acquired only from books transmitted to us with satisfying
evidence that they were written above seventeen hundred years ago, in a
remote country and foreign language, under the direction of the Spirit
of God. In order to attain the meaning of these books we must study the
language in which they were written; and we must study also the manners
of the times, and the state of the countries, in which the writers
lived; because these are circumstances to which an original author is
often alluding, and by which his phraseology is generally affected; we
must lay together different passages in which the same word or phrase
occurs, because without this labour we cannot ascertain its precise
signification; and we must mark the difference of style and manner which
characterizes different writers, because a right apprehension of their
meaning often depends upon attention to this difference. All this
supposes the application of grammar, history, geography, chronology, and
criticism in matters of religion; that is, it supposes that the reason
of man had been previously exercised in pursuing these different
branches of knowledge, and that our success in attaining the true sense
of Scripture depends upon the diligence with which we avail ourselves of
the progress that has been made in them. It is obvious that every
Christian is not capable of making this application. But this is no
argument against the use of reason, of which we are now speaking. For
they who use translations and commentaries rely only upon the reason of
others, instead of exercising their own. The several branches of
knowledge have been applied in every age by some persons for the benefit
of others; and the progress in sacred criticism, which distinguishes the
present times, is nothing else but the continued application, in
elucidating the Scripture, of reason enlightened by every kind of
subsidiary knowledge, and very much improved in this kind of exercise by
the employment which the ancient classics have given it since the
revival of letters.
After the two uses of reason that have been illustrated, a third comes
to be mentioned, which may be considered as compounded of both. Reason
is of eminent use in repelling the attacks of the adversaries of
Christianity. When men of erudition, of philosophical acuteness, and of
accomplished taste, direct their talents against our religion, the cause
is very much hurt by an unskilful defender. He cannot unravel their
sophistry; he does not see the amount and the effect of the concessions
which he makes to them; he is bewildered by their quotations, and he is
often led by their artifice upon dangerous ground. In all ages of the
church there have been weak defenders of Christianity; and the only
triumphs of the enemies of our religion have arisen from their being
able to expose the defects of those methods of defending the truth which
some of its advocates had unwarily chosen. A mind trained to accurate
and philosophical views of the nature and the amount of evidence,
enriched with historical knowledge, accustomed to throw out of a subject
all that is minute and irrelative, to collect what is of importance
within a short compass, and to form the comprehension of a whole, is the
mind qualified to contend with the learning, the wit, and the sophistry
of infidelity. Many such minds have appeared in this honourable
controversy during the course of this and the last century; and the
success has corresponded to the completeness of the furniture with which
they engaged in the combat. The Christian doctrine has been vindicated
by their masterly exposition from various misrepresentations; the
arguments for its divine original have been placed in their true light;
and the attempts to confound the miracles and prophecies upon which
Christianity rests its claim, with the delusions of imposture, have been
effectually repelled. Christianity has, in this way, received the most
important advantages from the attacks of its enemies; and it is not
improbable that its doctrines would never have been so thoroughly
cleared from all the corruptions and subtleties which had attached to
them in the progress of ages, nor the evidences of its truths have been
so accurately understood, nor its peculiar character been so perfectly
discriminated, had not the zeal and abilities which have been employed
against it called forth in its defence some of the most distinguished
masters of reason. They brought into the service of Christianity the
same weapons which had been drawn for her destruction, and, wielding
them with confidence and skill in a good cause, became the successful
champions of the truth.
The fourth use of reason consists in judging of the truths of religion.
Every thing which is revealed by God comes to his creatures from so high
an authority, that it may be rested in with perfect assurance as true.
Nothing can be received by us as true which is contrary to the dictates
of reason, because it is impossible for us to receive at the same time
the truth and the falsehood of a proposition. But many things are true
which we do not fully comprehend; and many propositions, which appear
incredible when they are first enunciated, are found, upon examination,
such as our understandings can readily admit. These principles embrace
the whole of the subject, and they mark out the steps by which reason is
to proceed in judging of the truths of religion. We first examine the
evidences of revelation. If these satisfy our understandings, we are
certain that there can be no contradiction between the doctrines of this
true religion, and the dictates of right reason. If any such
contradiction appear, there must be some mistake; by not making a proper
use of our reason in the interpretation of the Gospel, we suppose that
it contains doctrines which it does not teach; or we give the name of
right reason to some narrow prejudices which deeper reflection, and more
enlarged knowledge, will dissipate; or we consider a proposition as
implying a contradiction, when, in truth, it is only imperfectly
understood. Here, as in every other case, mistakes are to be corrected
by measuring back our steps. We must examine closely and impartially the
meaning of those passages which appear to contain the doctrine; we must
compare them with one another; we must endeavour to derive light from
the general phraseology of Scripture and the analogy of faith; and we
shall generally be able, in this way, to separate the doctrine from all
those adventitious circumstances which give it the appearance of
absurdity. If a doctrine which, upon the closest examination, appears
unquestionably to be taught in Scripture, still does not approve itself
to our understanding, we must consider carefully what it is that
prevents us from receiving it. There may be preconceived notions hastily
taken up which that doctrine opposes; there may be pride of
understanding that does not readily submit to the views which it
communicates; or reason may need to be reminded, that we must expect to
find in religion many things which we are not able to comprehend. One of
the most important offices of reason is to recognize her own limits. She
never can be moved, by any authority, to receive as true what she
perceives to be absurd. But, if she has formed a just estimate of human
knowledge, she will not shelter her presumption in rejecting the truths
of revelation under the pretence of contradictions that do not really
exist; she will readily admit that there may be in a subject some points
which she knows, and others of which she is ignorant; she will not allow
her ignorance of the latter to shake the evidence of the former, but
will yield a firm assent to that which she does understand, without
presuming to deny what is beyond her comprehension. And thus, availing
herself of all the light which she now has, she will wait in humble hope
for the time when a larger measure shall be imparted.